4: Cross L-5 (no date) 1948 E16 Slavs E16



175* 643 This process was occasionally delayed, if not arrested, by the appearance of competent princes who reëstablished for brief periods the stability and prestige of Kievan authority. For example, Vladimir Monomakh (1113-1125), grandson of Yaroslav, fought during his entire adult life either against the nomad Polovtsi or to maintain the unity of the principality against his kinsfolk, but such formal agreements as were reached for the assignment of domains to the various princely families were seldom of long standing. At the same time, the minor principalities of the western border were exposed to Polish or Hungarian aggression, and many southern frontier towns in the steppe country were either wiped out by the Polovtsi or abandoned because they might be.

175* 661 567 The confusion which prevailed during the sixty years after Yaroslav's death in 1054 marks the onset of the decline of Kiev. While the feuds and disputes among the kindred princes were fought out by the princes themselves and their servitors, the lower classes of the population—the free peasants and the humble urban artisans—saw their fields laid waste and their earning power curtailed. If one prince occupied by force the domain of another and then was forced to withdraw, he frequently dragged off with him on his retirement the peasantry of the area he had temporarily occupied, and turned them into slaves in his own district. The result was a decrease in the free population and an enormous increase in the number of slaves available for work on princely estates.

175* 162 166 By the end of the reign of Yaroslav the steppe country for one hundred miles or more south of Kiev had been settled by an agricultural population composed partly of free farmers, partly of war captives whom Yaroslav had located there, and partly by semicivilized pagans who had given up their nomad existence to live peacefully among their former foes and to form a sort of border militia. It was on this frontier population that the raids of the Polovtsi fell most heavily. The resulting migration from these exposed positions was most marked after 1125, but it began almost half a century

4: Cross L-5 (no date) 1948 E16 Slavs E16



far silent but ambitious proletariat. The lower strata of society were no longer looking for sympathy. They wanted power, and if properly led would break down all barriers to its attainment. The voice of the grumbling dispossessed first sounded clearly in Russian literature through Maxim Gorki's early stories, which began to appear in 1892. The best example of the young intellectual who discovered saving graces in Marxism was Lenin. He began to study Marx's *Capital* in 1888, organized a group of Marxists at Kuibyshev (Samara) in 1893, and was a social-democratic propagandist in St. Petersburg the next year. The emergence of Marxism as an active political and economic system in Russia dates from this period.

The rise of the Social Democratic party and the foundation of the more activist section known as the Bolsheviki (the maximalists) headed by Lenin himself preceded the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war by barely one year. At the same time, another radical party, the Social Revolutionaries, revived the tradition of terrorism as practiced before the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. The government pursued a policy of repression even when the necessity of prosecuting a war for which the nation was totally unprepared might well have dictated a more conciliatory attitude. Profound resentment now mastered not only the middle class but the urban proletariat, and though the police resorted to desperate provocatory acts in order to discredit the agitators, a united front against the government was rapidly forming. When open revolution broke out early in 1905, neither the middle-class liberals nor the radical Marxist groups possessed an organization equal to organizing and directing a mass movement. As a result, after the government made various constitutional concessions and the extremists showed every sign of fighting to a finish, the moderate groups gravitated away from the revolutionary idea, leaving the Marxist leaders and the workers isolated. With the urban middle class again passive, the government speedily recovered its sangfroid and applied repressive measures of forbidding severity which were far from supplying any basis for

6: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16



of enabling Poland to be admitted, at least *in extremis*, to the San Francisco Conference. For as the result of London and Washington's refusal, on April 18, to allow an invitation to be sent to the Warsaw Government, it looked as though Poland, the first victim of German aggression, might be absent from the discussion of the statute destined to preserve the world against the recurrence of similar attacks.

The invitation found the London Poles divided. Of the three organisations invited, M. Mikolajczyk, ex-President of the Council, and M. Stanczyk, Vice-President of the Central Executive Committee of the Polish Socialist Party, accepted; M. Witos declined the invitation on health grounds, and M. Zakowski, the representative of the Socialist Party, reflected the discord which had apparently developed in that party by refusing to join the delegation.

The trial of sixteen Poles who had been detained in Moscow for several weeks, charged with sabotage and anti-Soviet activities, interfered with the negotiations. In vain did the Poles in London try to secure their release, by emphasising the role these men had played in the Resistance; Marshal Stalin declared that the Conference must not prevent the trial from taking place. At the hearing certain of the accused pleaded guilty to acts of terrorism directed against Soviet troops, and attributable to the *Armija krajowa* (Armed Forces of the Interior), which had been recognised on the previous August 30[1] by the English and the Americans, and to a political organisation called *Niepodlegosc* (Independence). The verdict returned on June 21[2] was mitigated; the chief offender, General Okulicki, was condemned to ten years' imprisonment, while the remaining accused were either acquitted or received very light sentences.

The objects of this trial, synchronised with the Conference from which, on principle, was to come the reconciliation of the Warsaw Poles and the London Poles, seem to have been as follows. Firstly, to discredit the leaders of the Government-in-exile and their staffs; secondly, to give (by the verdict) an example of the Russians' spirit of moderation; and thirdly, to emphasise their unshakeable determination to put an end, once for all, to anti-Soviet propaganda on Polish territory.

So the agreement reached on June 23[2] found the atmosphere

1 [1944 -- Analyst]
2 [1945 -- Analyst]

6: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16



725 with 'Great Serbian' and 'reactionary' tendencies. Subsequently
648 a much more serious charge was made against him; carried away
175 by his struggle against the Communist elements, he was said to have parlied with the Occupying Authorites and with the agents of Nedich, the Serbian 'Quisling'. General Mihailovich was nevertheless the War Minister *in partibus* to the London Cabinet, where the accusations brought against him were never seriously considered until Churchill[1] echoed them. They were the basis of the case brought against his partisans in July, 1945, and the severe sentence passed against them.

[829] Then there was, between the London Government and the 'Tito Movement', the psychological opposition between the exiled politicians (except those of Czechoslovakia) and the insurgents, who, remaining within the country, risked their lives day in and day out. The latter were inclined to see the 'London people' as theorists, if not profiteers of the Resistance, who, in assured comfort and relative security, carried out a paid task with the pen or by radio.

[668] Finally, Tito's partisans merged, in many cases, with the Communist or extremist elements, for whom the old Yugoslav political formations and their staffs embodied a régime of despotism, patronage, and reaction, whose return to power would have constituted an historical retrogression.

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175 However, the break did not come immediately. Although King Peter agreed, under pressure from the Allies and especially from Russia, to disown Mihailovich, he showed greater hesitation in negotiating with Tito, whose republican trend and attachment to the Soviet régime were well known.

On June 16, 1944, he resigned himself, rather against his convictions, to authorising Choubachich to sign an agreement with Tito, which provisionally safeguarded the rights of the Crown. On the following November 1 he agreed to the formation of a National Union Government in liberated Yugoslavia. But he reserved his approval as to the nomination of a Regency and the exercise of political power by one single party, the National Liberation Front, until a Constituent Assembly should have met. On this point he even entered into conflict with his

[1] 'General Mihailovich, I regret to say, has gradually adopted a changed attitude, and certain of his leaders have parlied with Italian or German troops'. (Speech in the House of Commons on February 22, 1944.)

6: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16



own Government, which he forced to resign. The Choubachich Cabinet disregarded this and on January 23, 1946 published a communiqué, according to which the sovereign would not return to the country until a Constituent Assembly had pronounced on the question of the régime. In his absence, the royal power would be delegated to a Council of Regency whose members would be chosen from the London Government and from the Tito Government.

On January 30 the King finally agreed to this formula, as recommended by Moscow, London, and Washington.

Then Choubachich went to Belgrade to agree with Tito on the names for the new Government. Prolonged and painful haggling resulted in the formation of the Provisional Cabinet on March 7,[1] in which Tito kept the Presidency and the War Ministry, while Choubachich assumed control of Foreign Affairs. A Serbian democrat, Milan Grol, and a Croat Agrarian, Chouteï, entered the new administration.

Yugoslavia was to be reconstituted on a federative basis; the State itself officially took the name of 'Democratic and Federal Yugoslavia'. So the constitution of the 'Yugoslav' Government was followed by the formation of 'National' Governments, six in number—Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia. Care had been taken not to give this federal organisation a statute and frontiers, on account of the conflicts these would not have failed to provoke; the National Assembly would, in due course, decide upon the internal structure of the State.

It remained to be seen whether Tito would bring to the management of affairs the eminent qualities of which he had given proof in the Resistance. Would history salute him not only as a detached figure in the epic background against which the tragedy of the Serbian nation is played, but also as a reconstructor of the State?

Born in 1893 in the Croat village of Klanyets, Joseph Broz was the son of an artisan. He had known hardship in his youth, and soon exhibited a revolutionary temperament. At seventeen he engineered a strike, and showed himself to be an agitator. It is said that he took his appellation of 'Tito' from the bishop of medieval Crete whose relics rest in the Church of St. Mark in Venice. Taken prisoner by the Russians in 1914, he took part

[1] [1946 -- Analyst]

6: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16



176 648 aggressive policy, or against any other State which might revive this policy, under any form whatsoever.

Backed both without and within by the might of Moscow, Tito's régime seemed to be irresistibly established.

Its[1] first care had been to renew its claim to the territories of which Yugoslavia had been defrauded immediately after the First World War. It raised the question of Trieste and its hinterland. The Yugoslav delegation in London warmly defended a case supported by detailed and absolutely pertinent documentation, based on ethnographic and economic considerations. But they were imprudent enough to allow it to be understood that they would lay claim to Aegean or Hellenic Macedonia—which was bound to alienate the goodwill of Great Britain. They also mentioned the exorbitant sum which they intended to demand from Italy by way of reparations—thereby upsetting the United States, from whom Italy was at the same time seeking material aid to help her out of her desperate financial situation.

642 • 661 175 Yet, to tell the truth, the distrustful atmosphere which grew up around the Yugoslav claims arose more directly from the form of government and the political principles established by Tito. Under colour of anti-Fascism, the régime exercised the same reprisals against all its detractors. It was accused of borrowing the methods of the totalitarian régimes; the Opposition said that it had introduced the word 'Democracy' into the name of the State in order to dispense with it in reality, as, in the past, Pavelich gave the name of 'Independent State of Croatia' to a political offshoot of the Axis. He governed, on Russian lines, a very sensitive nation, which perhaps had not a very 'Western' notion of democracy, but had always shown itself stubbornly attached to the external forms of its independence. Certainly Tito had succeeded in grouping around him zealous young men, who had been tested under fire and were indifferent to the juridical or constitutional rites which, in the West, accompany the exercise of liberty. Certainly, too, the Yugoslav National Front represented itself not as a single party but as a synthesis of all the various energies resolved to work for the restoration of public life.

656 204 625 Nevertheless to Anglo-American eyes the régime appeared to be a dictatorship. Was not its slogan—'No liberty for the enemies of liberty'—calculated to justify an administration

1 [Tito's régimes -- Analyst]

6: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16



648 175 protest, had refused to load the boat carrying UNRRA supplies to Yugoslavia, received instructions from their Union to proceed with the loading.

648 175 661 Hardly had this incident been settled when a fresh one arose, provoked by the American notes of July 26, August 10 and 18, and October 18, denouncing the internment in concentration camps, without any legal steps having been taken, of 165 persons entitled to claim American nationality; ten of these, it was alleged, had died as the result of ill-treatment. The Washington Government 'expressed the deep horror it felt at such practices, which are a violation of the principles of international law regarding the protection of foreign nationals, which amount to instances of unwilling or forced labour, in disregard of the natural rights of human beings, and present no feature to distinguish them from slavery'. Belgrade replied that the persons concerned were members of the German minority, were formerly affiliated to the *Kulturbund*, and had formed part of the fifth column, under cover of a borrowed nationality. The Government agreed to liberate the non-Yugoslavs whose American nationality should be recognised by the United States Embassy, on condition that they should leave the country immediately if they were *Volkdeutsche*.

Yugoslavia, in her turn, lodged a complaint against the United States, when she demanded the return of her river flotilla, detained in the upper reaches of the Danube by the American authorities. The latter recognised Yugoslavia's rights to 161 vessels, but contested ownership of sixteen others. It was not until the beginning of November, 1946, that restitution was ordered.

Another incident—omitting the arrests or charging of American nationals or members of the United States Embassy staff suspected of spying[6]—was caused by the closing, on September, 26, 1946, of the American Information Bureau in Belgrade, accused of circulating information prejudicial to the safety of the State. In this matter, the State Department appeared to disapprove of the zeal of Ambassador Patterson; after an exchange of notes, the Bureau was reopened in the following month.

[6] Especially in January 1947 in connection with the Trifounovich case.

6; Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16



648 175 —in other words, renounce the very principles for which they would have been elected.

Pressed by solicitations or criticisms from London and Washington, M. Gheorgiev placed himself under the ægis of Moscow. He went to Russia on January 7, 1946. 'I am glad', he said on landing, 'to be within the fortress of the Slavonic peoples, which, thanks to the wise direction of Generalissimo Stalin, has become the hope of the whole of democratic humanity'. And to give a yet more decisive proof of the credit which he enjoyed in Moscow, his visit was immediately followed (on January 10) by that of M. Vyshinsky to Sofia.

• [661] These manifestations did indeed strengthen the Bulgarian Government majority, but they disarmed neither the English nor the Americans, who protested, in diplomatic notes, against the police tactics of the régime, and the arrests of politicians.[1] In return, the Russians accused the Western Democracies of giving a false interpretation to Moscow's decisions affecting Bulgaria, and of encouraging subversive elements.

642 175 In Sofia, they showed signs of anxiety over the persistence of this lack of harmony on the eve of the conclusion of the peace treaties, on which the future of Bulgaria was to depend. M. Gheorgiev hoped to clarify the situation by resigning on March 22. But the Opposition imposed, as a condition of its accepting office, the exclusion of any Communist from the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office. Agreement proved impossible; another Gheorgiev cabinet, restricted, like the previous one, to the parties of the Patriotic Front, was formed on March 29, 1946.

A few days later, this Government promulgated a decree convening the National Assembly, charged with revising the Constitution on Republican lines. The monarchical régime was denounced to the country as the cause of all its misfortunes—a statement which could, with greater truth, have been applied to the Treaty of San Stefano and the Macedonian psychosis it had

661 [1] For three months, the arrested men included Assen Stamboliiski, son of the famous Agrarian leader, assassinated in 1923, and a member of the Central Committee of the Agrarian Party. One of the grievances harboured by the Bulgarian Agrarians against the Communists was the attitude of neutrality maintained by the latter at the time of the *coup d'état* of June 9, 1923, which had marked the triumph of 'reaction' over Stamboliiski's régime.

6: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16



war, now had only three—Russia, Germany, and Czechoslovakia. One aspect of her new position which represented an innovation was her transformation into a great maritime nation, thanks to the three ports, Stettin, Gdynia, and Danzig, and to her 312 miles of coast-line. Nevertheless, her destiny would henceforth be more closely bound to that of Central Europe, while remaining subordinate to the *entente* with Moscow.

The western frontiers were approved by the plebiscite of June 30, which covered not only the frontier-ratification, but also the abolition of the Senate and the economic organisation of the State (Agrarian reform and nationalisation of key industries). The first ballot gave 10,534,697 in favour and 995,584 against; the second gave 7,844,522 in favour and 3,686,029 against; the third, 8,896,106 in favour and 2,634,446 against.

This popular referendum did not have the tranquillising effects that had seemingly been expected. Poland continued to be a prey to 'terrorist' agitation, the repression of which, in turn, gave rise to scenes of violence and to exactions. While dissociating himself from the extremists, the leader of the Polish Peasant Party, M. Mikolajczyk, himself protested against the way in which the referendum had been carried out (except in Cracow, where the 'Noes' had been in the majority). So the British Government reserved its opinion on the legitimacy which this poll conferred on the régime, and awaited the general elections before giving legal recognition to the new state of affairs. And the whole of 1946 was taken up with exchanges of subacid notes between London and Washington on the one side and Warsaw on the other. The Anglo-Americans denounced the persecution to which the Opposition was subjected, and considered that the Polish Government was failing in the undertaking given in execution of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, to guarantee the liberty of elections. But the Russians interpreted quite differently both the scope of these agreements and the meaning of the word 'liberty'. And so the most obvious result of the diplomatic offensive on the part of England and the United States was to intensify Polish-Sovietic solidarity.

The formation, in June, of a National Unity Government under the Presidency of M. Osubka Morawski seemed, for the time being, to dissipate the apprehensions of the Anglo-Americans, although the dissident Polish Government in London

8: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16



642 175 563 the preceding Constitutions, this one contained no clause designed to protect minorities.

[666] The elections, postponed until May 30,[1] gave 88 per cent of the votes (6,429,145) to the National Front, but the figure of 770,100 blank voting slips exceeded that anticipated by the Government. The latter was, however, fully master of the situation. On June 14 Clement Gottwald was elected President of the Republic, on the unanimous vote of the 296 deputies present. Under the chairmanship of Zapotocki, he formed a Cabinet on the lines of the previous one (sixteen Communists or supporters, and six non-Communists); the portfolio of Foreign Affairs remained in the hands of Klementis, who replaced Masaryk. The new Head of the Government announced implacable repressive action against 'those guilty of disorder or confusion, who seek to hinder the reconstruction of the country'.

• [661] 659 798 175 Indeed, during the months that followed, there was a vigorous purging of diplomacy, the army, the police. But, in 1949, it was the religious question which was to dominate political life, owing to an offensive conducted against the Roman Church, opposing the old Czech Hussite spirit to Catholicism, the dominant trait in the Slovak national character.

Gottwald and his ministers, relying on this 'religious geography' peculiar to Czechoslovakia, embarked upon a struggle with the clergy in the domain of monopoly of the schools. They pursued the contest by seeking to alienate the Catholic Church from her natural hierarchy, and by encouraging the 'schism' of the Czech 'National' Church. To protest against the obstacles put in the way of the exercise of the cult, the bishops drew up a pastoral letter, setting forth the conditions required in order to regularise relations between the Church and the State. The Government forbade the distribution of the pastoral; infringements of this decree, specially numerous in Slovakia, were firmly repressed. Mgr. Beran, Archbishop of Prague, was detained in his palace; the civil authority created 'Catholic Action', an official organisation placed under the control of priests with Communist leanings. At the head of this movement was the Minister of Public Health, Father Plojhar, suspended by the ecclesiastical authorities for having sought a legislative mandate without his bishop's permission.

Tension rose with the 'resolutions' passed on June 28 by the

1 [1948 -- Analyst]

6: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16



Congregation of the Holy Office, forbidding the publication and diffusion of Communist doctrine.

So the *Kulturkampf* was waged, now energetically, now quietly. The Prague Government was accused by the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, of violating 'human dignity and civilisation'; once more the conflict passed from the national to the international level, symbolising the ideological antagonism which exists between the Soviet world and the Western democracies. Neither the Government nor the clergy showed any signs of weakening. On November 17 the bishops again asked the civil power to abandon the laws relating to religious teaching, as conceived by the State, and the interference of lay authorities in the nomination of priests and the administration of Church property.

The end of the year 1949 was marked by waves of purges in Communist circles, and by fresh trials on charges of treason, incriminating, like those of Budapest and Sofia, Tito's 'agents' or 'accomplices'.

* * *

During this period politics in Poland were somewhat less sensational than in the other Slav countries. There again, however, the régime of 'popular democracy' evolved in the direction of Stalin-Marxism. The struggle against the Church was less open, and did not, as in Czechoslovakia, go to the length of making the clergy civil servants. The Government concentrated its efforts particularly on increasing exports, on economic reconstruction, and on exploiting the German lands brought under its control—and these efforts, it must be admitted, were attended with remarkable results.

The German Question was its chief external problem; in its view, it was France's policy in respect of the Reich which prevented the renewal of the Franco-Polish treaty of alliance. What Warsaw particularly feared was lest a change of attitude on the part of the Allies towards Germany should reopen the question of the Oder-Neisse frontier, which the Poles considered sacrosanct, but which transferred to them territories whose final allocation was, legally, postponed until the making of the peace treaty for the Reich.

The most sensational event was the nomination (on November 7)[1] of Rokossovsky, the Soviet Marshal (of Polish

1 [1949 -- Analyst]

2 [1949 -- Analyst]